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Abstract
Military intelligence is underutilized in the study of civil war violence. Declas-
sified records are hard to acquire and difficult to explore with the standard econo-
metrics toolbox. I investigate a contemporary government database of civilians
targeted during the Vietnam War. The data are detailed, with up to 45 attributes
recorded for 73,712 individual civilian suspects. I employ an unsupervised ma-
chine learning approach of cleaning, variable selection, dimensionality reduction,
and clustering. I find support for a simplifying typology of civilian targeting that
distinguishes different kinds of suspects and different kinds targeting methods.
The typology is robust, successfully clustering both government actors and rebel
departments into groups that mirror their known functions. The exercise highlights
methods for dealing with high dimensional found conflict data. It also illustrates
how aggregating measures of political violence masks a complex underlying em-
pirical data generating process as well as a complex institutional reporting process.
1 Introduction
Civil wars blur the line between civilians and combatants. This is the fundamental
problem for governments that must separate rebels from innocents and for civilians
wanting to remain neutral and safe. Military and police forces expend enormous re-
sources attempting to identify and eliminate specific individuals fighting for violent
groups. What do those programs look like from the inside? How do they pick their
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the United States National Archives staff, particularly Richard Boylan and Lynn Goodsell for generously
sharing their time and expertise. I am grateful for comments from Erik Gartzke, Joanne Gowa, Kristen
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targets? How effective are they, and how are their costs distributed across both civilian
and rebel supporters?
Targeting programs are necessarily secretive, which makes government records
hard to come by. When available, they tend to consist of unwieldy, unstructured, and
often undigitized intelligence dossiers, which makes quantitative analysis an expensive
proposition.1 Because of these problems, nearly all existing studies of targeting pro-
grams are either qualitative in nature (Moyar & Summers, 1997; Comber, 2008; Nat-
apoff, 2009) or depend on data developed from nongovernment sources like interviews,
surveys, and news reports (Ball et al., 2007; Silva et al., 2009).2 When declassified
government records are available, they tend to be at the event level, like attacks (Biddle
et al., 2012; Berman et al., 2011) or air operations (Lyall, 2014) without details on the
victims. The rare exception are peacetime police records like Stop and Frisk data from
New York, which provide information on both demographic details about the suspect
and details of the altercation (Gelman et al., 2007).
I analyze an electronic database of civilian targeting efforts created during the Viet-
nam War. The data are extensive, covering 73,712 individual rebel suspects from the
perspective of the government’s police and military operations. The database contains
detailed information on both the victims and the operations targeting them.3 At issue
are two central questions.
The first is descriptive: How exactly does a civilian targeting program work in
practice? All civilian targeting programs are secretive, but the Phoenix Program is
uniquely surrounded in historical controversy. During and immediately after the war
critics and proponents debated whether it was a broad intelligence and policing effort or
simply a punitive assassination program (Colby & McCargar, 1989). Since the war, the
discussion has turned to whether the Phoenix Program achieved its aims of neutralizing
high ranking targets (Thayer, 1985). More recently, it has been asked why the program
caught some suspects while letting others escape, and what implications that might
have for civilians deciding whether to join rebellion (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).
The second is theoretical: How should we conceptualize civilian targeting? Is there
a simpler topology we can use to classify violence against civilians in terms of the
kinds of victims or the kinds of methods employed? Much of the work on civilian
targeting either explicitly or implicitly dissagregates along the severity of targeting,
treating killings as distinct from arrests because they are theoretically different or easier
to document. Others divide targeting along how the victims are selected, particularly
whether they were individually singled out or targeted as part of a larger group (Kalyvas
2006). Is there a principled and data driven way to categorize and describe civilian
1Two prime examples include the East German Stasi files which came into public stewardship, and the
Guatemalan National Police Archive which is now in the charge of government and international humanitar-
ian agencies as part of a truth and reconciliation effort (Aguirre et al., 2013). The records are comprehensive
but unstructured and will require a major effort to analyze once the all of the raw documents are digitized
(Price et al., 2009).
2For some of the issues and methodology of working with retrospective sources see (Price & Ball, 2014;
Seybolt et al., 2013).
3With few exceptions, the database and most declassified intelligence products from the Vietnam War
have remained unused. This is partially because working with found data is technically challenging, requiring
extensive cleaning and documentation— and partially because the tools for such data are only now gaining
popularity in the social sciences.
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targeting?
Providing an answer to both questions requires a highly inductive and multivariate
approach. The overall analytical strategy is familiar in the machine learning literature.
I start with a database I did not create and for which I have partial, incomplete docu-
mentation. Using clues like patterns of missingness, I determine that there are related
groups of attributes and records drawn from completely different sub-populations of
suspects. I then show how to prioritize and reduce the over forty available attributes for
each suspect to a manageable core group of key facts. I finally perform dimensionality
reduction on those facts, finding useful and easy to understand dimensions on which
both suspects and targeting tactics varied– providing an answer to both how we should
conceptualize civilian targeting and how the Phoenix Program operated.
In the course of conducting the analysis, I intend the chapter to serve as a primer
for handling large, multivariate, found conflict data. An increasing number of scholars
works with observational data that they did not create, and over which they had no con-
trol. They spend extraordinary effort on model specification for a suspected empirical
data generating process, but typically pay little attention to the institutional data gen-
erating process underlying the reporting and recording of facts. The Phoenix Program
database provides an example of how working with found data is at best an adversarial
relationship. This poses unique problems for inference, but I demonstrate some of the
growing number of tools that help to tackle these kinds of problems.
The road map of the chapter is as follows. The second section provides an empirical
background for civilian targeting during the Vietnam War. The third section provides
a broad overview of the data created to track that targeting. A detailed examination of
the database reveals undocumented heterogeneity between different kinds of records,
groups of related attributes, and a ranking attributes’ importance, pinpointing exactly
where to start the analysis.
Section four develops a taxonomy of victims. Dimensionality reduction on a set of
key attributes reveals two key differences between suspects: (1) priority, those who the
government wishes it could target and those it targets in practice; and (2) severity, how
violent the suspect’s final fate, ranging from voluntary defection, to arrest or capture,
and at the extreme, death.
Section five develops a taxonomy of tactics. Dimensionality reduction on just ob-
servations where the government carried out an operation (killings and arrests) reveals
differences between tactics along: (1) priority, but also premeditation, how specifically
the individual was targeted prior to the arrest or killing; and (2) domain, whether a
suspect was targeted in operations with some connection to policing and intelligence
resources, or whether the suspect was targeted by third party forces and then retroac-
tively reported.
A final section concludes with broader implications for security studies and sug-
gests avenues for future research.
3
2 The Empirical Background: War in South Vietnam
and the Phoenix Program
In the later years of the Vietnam War, the South Vietnamese government went on the of-
fensive against the nonmilitary members and supporters of the rebel opposition. While
politically effective, the 1968 Tet-Offensive was a military setback for irregular forces
that shifted the main military threat from the organized rural insurgency to the incom-
ing conventional forces from North Vietnam. The government took advantage of this
shift by pushing out into rural areas, projecting its power with a wide range of police,
militia, military, and special forces units. With the expansion of government control
and a flood of funds, logistical support, and U.S. advisers, the government set out to
map, monitor, and police its civilian population at an industrial scale. Goals were set
out to dismantle the political opposition with widespread arrests, killings, and induced
defections.
The Phoenix Program (Phung Hoang) was created in 1968 to coordinate this initia-
tive — which was, in reality, fractured across dozens of separate intelligence and po-
lice initiatives across South Vietnam. Its substance as an institution included national
guidelines that influenced targeting goals and reporting, as well as physical offices con-
taining advisors who coordinated and distributed information on suspects. While the
program was not responsible for directly acting against suspects, it was instrumental
in bringing together and documenting all of the scattered existing efforts (Moyar &
Summers, 1997). It was in operation until it collapsed during the Eastertide invasion
by North Vietnam at the end of 1972.4
The process by which the program collected information was scattered and disjoint.
Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (IOCCs) maintained Lists of Com-
munist Offenders and sometimes detailed maps of hamlets, with names of occupants
and photographs.5 Military units like the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
(mechanized) sometimes formed special teams from its military intelligence detach-
ment to coordinate with and make up for weak IOCCs in their area, maintaining their
own card file in addition to the Local List of Communist Offenders.6 Additionally, vil-
lage, district, and province chiefs often maintained their own parallel intelligence nets
and records.7
In January of 1969, the Office of the Secretary through the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (the predecessor to DARPA) began Project VICEX to develop a country-
4It began out of a regional coordination effort called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for the
attack on the VCI (ICEX) in July 1967. By 1968, Phung Hoang Committees were established 44 provinces
and 228 districts.
5Example members of a typical district IOCC team included Village Chiefs, Deputy Village Chiefs for
Security, Village Military Affairs Commissioners, Village National Police Chiefs, Popular Forces Platoon
Leaders, Hamlet Chiefs, and more.
6Military Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam Lessons Learned No. 80: US Combat Forces in Support
of Pacification, 29 June 1970. Saigon, Vietnam: Headquarters, U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance
Advisory Group, 1970-06-29 http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/u?/p4013coll11,1524.
7“Phung Hoang Review”, December 1970. Pg 11 from VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE NEUTRAL-
IZATION SYSTEMS (VCINS), no date, Folder 065, US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Doc-
uments Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 17 Apr. 2015.
<http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1201065056>.
4
wide information reporting system to coordinate and allow comparative analysis of
IOCC information.8 Biographical data on suspects and neutralizations were entered
into the national database at district and province IOCCs. Enumerators were trained
with coding guidelines for converting dossiers and neutralization reports into a stan-
dardized format.9 The data were then passed up to the Phung Hoang Directorate and
from there to the National Police Command Data Management Center, where they were
recorded using punch-cards before being entered onto magnetic tape with an IBM360
mainframe.
3 Overview of the Targeting Database
The United States preserved an electronic copy of the final targeting database called
the National Police Infrastructure Analysis Subsystem II (NPIASS-II).10 It contains
records from July 1970 to December 1972. This is the later period of the war, following
the Tet Offensive, the GVN and the U.S. counter attack, and the period of U.S. with-
drawal. It contains data on 73,717 individuals (rows) that I refer to as suspects and who
serve as the unit of observation. It contains 45 attributes (columns) that provide infor-
mation on each suspect about their biography, job, details of operations targeted against
them, and their final disposition.11 The attributes are of mixed types including numeri-
cal, nominal, dates, and nested lookup codes such as locations (e.g. region->province-
>district->village) and rebel jobs (e.g. National Liberation Front->Liberation Woman’s
Association->Personnel). The structure of the database is outlined in Table 1.
Record Type Status Outcome
Suspects
(73,712)
Neutralization
Record (48,074) Neutralized(49,756)
Killed (15,438)
Captured (22,215)
Biographical
Record (25,638)
Defector (12,103)
At Large (23,943) At Large (23,943)
Table 1: Structure of the National Police Infrastructure Analysis Subsystem II
(NPIASS-II) database. The unit of observation (rows) are individual suspects. The
potential attributes (columns) are available in blocks depending on the kind of record
and outcome.
8“Org and Mission,” April 1969, Phung Hoang Directorate, Records of the Office of Civil Operations
for Rural Development Support (CORDS), General Records, 1967-1971; Record Group 472.3.10. National
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. ARC Identifier: 4495500.
9Reference Copy of Technical Documentation for Accessioned Electronic Records, National Police In-
frastructure Analysis Subsystem (NPIASS) I & II Master Files, Record Group 472 Records of the U.S.
Forces in Southeast Asia. Electronic Records Division, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration,
College Park, Md.
10United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam/Civil Operations Rural Development Support
(MACORDS) National Police Infrastructure Analysis Subsystem II (NPIASS II), 1971-1973. File Num-
ber 3-349-79-992-D. Created by the Military Assistance Command/Civil Operations and Rural Development
Support-Research and Analysis (MACORDS-RA). U.S. Military Assistance Command/Civil Operations Ru-
ral Development Support.
11The total number of attributes is higher if multipart attributes are disaggregated or if low to no variance
attributes are included.
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The first-order task with found data such as these is to verify the structure of the
database. Available codebooks often do not document important details, and when they
do, the documentation is often at odds with how the database was used in practice. I
take a two-pronged approach. First, I point to archival evidence about the genesis of
and day-to-day use of the program. In particular, I located detailed coding instructions
for a precursor database, the VCI Neutralization and Identification Information System
(VCINIIS), which appears to share most if not all of the same properties of the final
NPIASS-II database.12 Second, I apply a machine learning approach to the structure
of the database overall, not just the tabular values of individual variables. Patterns of
missing values, the meaning of different variables, and heterogeneity between different
kinds of observations are all targets of inquiry.
One revelation from the documentation of the predecessor system is that the database
combines two different kinds of records: those entered while a suspect was still at large
(a biographical record) and those entered after a suspect had already been killed, cap-
tured, or defected (a neutralization record). The two kinds of records resulted from
different worksheets, with separate text examples, and coding guidelines. Neutraliza-
tion records appear to have recorded the Phoenix Program as it actually happened on
the ground. Two thirds of suspects, 48,074 (65%), were entered in as neutralization
records. Biographical records were a kind of growing wish list where analysts both-
ered to digitize information from the much larger pool of suspects with dossiers, on
blacklists, or reported in the Political Order of Battle. A third of suspects, 25,638
(35%), were entered this way.
The second important division in the database is along the fate of each suspect, as
still at large, killed, captured, or defector (rallier). All bibliographic records start off
as at large suspects. In rare cases (6.6%), some were updated to show the suspect had
later been neutralized, though there are sufficient irregularities to suspect that some of
these are actually coding errors.
The Phoenix Program was not, at least predominately, an assassination program.
The dominant form of neutralization was arrests/captures (45%). A smaller share
(24%) of neutralizations were suspects that turned themselves in, defecting. Killings
made up only a third of neutralizations documented by the database (31%).
3.1 Example Narrative and Coding
To illustrate the kinds of information available (and the kinds of facts that are omitted),
I provide the following comparison of a suspect’s record in the database with their de-
tailed interrogation report. The record was deanonymized by manually comparing data
fields against reported details in declassified interrogation reports from the Combined
Military Interrogation Center (CMIC).13 Below is a brief narrative of a suspect’s life,
12“VCI Neutralization and Identification Information System (VCINIIS) Reporting and Coordination Pro-
cedures.” Folder: "1603-03A Operational Aids, 1969," ARC Identifier: 5958372, Administrative and Op-
erational Records, compiled 05/1967 - 1970, documenting the period 1966 - 1970, HMS Entry Number(s):
A1 724, Record Group 472: Records of the U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, 1950 - 1976. National Archives
at College Park, College Park, MD.
13“VCI of the Soc Trang Province Party Committee,” March 1971, Folder 11, Box 09, Douglas Pike
Collection: Unit 05 - National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
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career, circumstance of defection, and immediate aftermath drawn from his interroga-
tion report and with facts corroborated by the NPIASS-II database underlined in the
text.
In 1929, a man named To Van Xiem was born in Thai Binh Province (North Viet-
nam). He attended four years of village school and worked on his parents’ farm until
January 1950 where he joined the Viet Minh. He was a probationary member beginning
June 1950 and became a full party member in 1951. Over the next sixteen years he was
promoted or reassigned to multiple roles within North Vietnam until February 25, 1966,
when he and fifty-six other civilian political cadre infiltrated South Vietnam, arriving
in Tay Ninh Province. In July of that year, he was assigned as a cadre of the Ca Mau
Province Party Committee Farmers’ Association Section. In March of 1967 he was
reassigned to the same position in Soc Trang Province. In September 1969 he became
a member of the Current Affairs Section of the Farmers’ Association Section, living in
Ba Xuyen Province. He was a Buddhist, middle class farmer, married twice with sev-
eral children. Citing increasing hardships, limited rations, and almost total government
control of the province, he defected at Xuyen District, Ba Xuyen Province on March
21, 1971. He was previously unknown to security forces, not listed on any blacklist,
and his identity was confirmed by confession. Four days later, March, 25, 1971, his
neutralization was entered into the national database. He was assigned a VCI serial
number 41-100825, indicating a new, previously unlisted neutralization record. He
was interrogated July 25, 1971 by the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC)
in Saigon where he was assigned a CMIC number of 0297-71. Details from his inter-
rogation produced a 30 page report that documented the names and details of 52 other
individuals as well as a number of regional organizations.
3.2 The Attributes
The full list of 45 attributes are provided below in Table 2. Attributes are arranged
into groups, determined using a combination of descriptions from the codebooks and
an unsupervised clustering method described fully below. I have further aggregated
the groups into four broad concepts; attributes that are always available, typically only
available for biographical records, typically only available for neutralization records,
and only available for neutralization records of suspects who defected or were captured.
Accessed 9 Apr. 2015. http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2310911004.
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Almost Always Available Biographical Record Neutralization Record Captured/Defector
Serial Number At Large‡ Killed/Capt./Defect. Detention Facility
Job Birth Place Action Force
Bio Process. Date ID Source Arrest Level
Echelon Bio Info Date Neut. Process. Date Arrest Serial
Sex Dossier Location Neut. Action Date Arrest Year
Black List Neut. Location
Party Membership Photo Sentence Process. Date
Area of Operation Prints Specific Target Sentence Date
Priority A/B∗ Arrest Order Operation Level Sentence Code
Record Updates Address IOCC Involvement Sentence Location
Confirmation
Age Release Process. Date
Release Action Date
Release Code
Release Location
Arrest Forwarding
Forw. Process. Date
Forw. Action Date
Forw. Location
∗Imputed from official position Greenbook. ‡Mutually exclusive and so merged with Killed/Capt./Defector
Table 2: Attributes for each suspect in the NPIASS-II database.
3.3 Grouping Attributes and Records
The codebooks provide descriptions of each attribute but they omit important details
such as how missing values are handled. Every observation has at least some missing
attributes and nearly 50% of cells are empty. Some of the patterns are self-explanatory,
e.g. there will be no information about sentencing if the suspect is still at large. In other
cases, missingness is more subtle, e.g. information on the suspect’s age is sometimes
missing for suspects who were killed in the field without questioning. In all cases there
appears to be a combination of missing at random and undocumented structure. This
ambiguity and apparent latent structure suggests applying a machine learning approach
to learning how attributes are related to one another.
I frame this as a blockclustering problem where the task is to simultaneously find r
groups of attributes and k groups of observations that are similar in terms of missing-
ness. Let an I×Q binary matrix, XNA, represent the missingness for each individual i
and attribute q, shown on the left in Figure 1. The task is to decompose this matrix into
a version sorted by row and column into homogenous blocks XˆNA, shown on the right
side of Figure 1, and a smaller r by k binary matrix of row and column clusters.
I employ an unsupervised bi-clustering algorithm, the Bernoulli Latent Block Model
(Govaert & Nadif, 2003).14 The model is fit with a wide range of possible row and col-
14 Implemented in the R package Blockcluster (Bhatia et al., 2014).
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umn cluster counts, and the final model is selected with the best fit according to the
integrated complete likelihood (ICL) (Biernacki et al., 2000).
Figure 1: Block clustering of missing values in NPIASS-II into 11 groups of attributes
and 9 groups of observations. True values (white) indicate a missing value.
The structure of missingness in the NPIASS-II database is best explained by 11
clusters of attributes and 9 clusters of observations (ICL=−260339.9). For substantive
reasons discussed next, I further split off dossier related attributes as a separate cluster
bringing the total to 12. These are the low level groups of attributes shown in Table 2.
In almost every case, the method has recovered known groups of variables as de-
tailed in the codebook. In a few cases it has correctly identified an attribute as belonging
to a different group despite a misleading original variable name. The six record clus-
ters recover the undocumented split between biographical records and neutralization
records, the existence of neutralizations with additional follow up information about
sentencing and release, and the existence of a small number of biographical records
that were updated with neutralizations. Since these record clusters might have fur-
ther substantive implications, I include record cluster as an additional attribute in the
analysis below.
Why devote special care to analysis of missingness? In this instance, motivation
comes from a discovered detail with major substantive implications for the only other
recent study to use this database. Kalyvas & Kocher (2007) ask whether a suspect
with weak evidence against them was more or less likely to be neutralized than a sus-
pect with strong evidence against them. They focus on the dossier attribute called
“confirmed” which is when a suspect is identified by three different sources or one ir-
refutable source. They find that confirmed suspects, with presumably more evidence
against them, were actually much less likely to be neutralized than unconfirmed sus-
pects. If true, this would have a troubling implication that the guilty can be much safer
than the innocent from government targeting in an insurgency.
In fact, this counter-intuitive result turns entirely on a technical detail; “confirmed”
and a few other dossier related attributes were stored as a 0/1 bit flag in original IBM360
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system. When they were converted to modern formats, 0 values were converted to “No”
instead of missing and so all 48,074 neutralization records were accidentally counted
as unconfirmed neutralizations. Confirmation may have played a role in neutralization,
but the database does not record it in a way that makes the desired comparison possible.
This is a tricky mistake to catch, an undocumented difference in record types plus
an undocumented imputation of values. However, it pops out in this analysis of miss-
ingness since there appears to be at least two different kinds of records mixed together
and all of the other dossier attributes tend to be missing for neutralization records. It
also pops out in the analysis of attribute importance and interaction that I turn to next.
3.4 Variable Selection
Each suspect in the database has potentially over forty known facts about them. If you
were forced to describe an observation to someone else, which fact would you start
with?15 What is the single most important fact about a suspect? The second most
important fact? The third? And so on. Typically these decisions are made on an ad
hoc basis given the researcher’s theoretical interests. Here, the focus is in part learning
the structure of the database and so we need a principled definition of what makes an
attribute important, and a method for ranking attributes on that dimension.
I frame this as an unsupervised learning problem, where the task is to learn rules
and relationships between attributes that could be used to distinguish a real observation
from a synthetic randomly shuffled version. The only way to tell a real observation
from a randomly generated one is to learn patterns of regularity and structure between
attributes. In this conception, an attribute is important if it conveys a great deal of
information about what other values a suspect’s attributes will take. The most important
fact is the one that provides the most information for inferring other facts. The least
important fact is the one that provides completely unique but orthogonal or potentially
random information.16
The classifier I use for this task is an unsupervised random forest.17 Random forests
are an ensemble method that combines the predictions of many individual base learn-
ers. The individual learners in this case are fully grown binary decision trees, each fit
to a different random subset of attributes and random subset of observations (Breiman,
2001).18 In the supervised case, cut points for covariates are selected to separate ob-
servations into increasingly homogeneous groups on some outcome variable. In the
unsupervised case, the random forest learns to identify a genuine observation from a
synthetic scrambled version (Shi & Horvath, 2006). This method works for both cat-
15Put another way, suspects are situated in some high dimensional space where there is more underlying
structure than we could ever hope to completely document. What structure should we prioritize as the most
dominant or interesting in the data?
16Note that this is a reversal of the typical variable selection process, where the goal is to better explain
some outcome by removing redundant information to produce a smaller number of uncorrelated explanatory
variables. In this multivariate setting, there is no single outcome and the redundancies are the details of
interest.
17Implemented in the R package randomForestSRC (Ishwaran & Kogalur, 2014).
18I employ 1000 trees, trying seven variables at each split, minimum of one unique case at each split, and
fully grown trees with no stopping criteria. Splits with missing values are first determined using non-missing
in-bag observations, and then observations with that attribute missing are randomly assigned to a child node.
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egorical and continuous variables and is non-parametric, so there’s no need for prior
knowledge of an underlying functional form.
The most useful information for this learning task is provided by strong and regular
relationships between variables, and so each decision tree will tend to select variables
with multiple strong interactions earlier in the process, toward the root of the tree.
Therefore, I measure the importance of a variable as the average distance from the root
node to its maximal subtree (the earliest point in the tree that splits on the variable)
(Ishwaran et al., 2010). The interaction of two variables is captured by the depth of
their second-order maximal subtree (the distance from the root node of one variable’s
maximal subtree within the maximal subtree of the other), as trees tend to split on one
variable and then soon split on a related variable. I define a symmetric distance between
two variables as the sum of their second-order maximal subtree depths. This distance
is small when both variables tend to split close to the root, soon after one another, and
large if either splits late in the tree or far from the other.19 This approach provides two
remarkable pieces of summary information shown in Figure 2.
19Summing the second-order maximal subtree depths is a stronger test of interaction and is a novel inno-
vation so far as the author is aware.
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Dossier Fingerprints (43)
Dossier Photograph (34)
Dossier Arrest Order (26)
Dossier Address (25)
Dossier Confirmation (24)
Record Type (21)
Bio Process Date (29)
Birth Location (30)
Dossier Location (27)
Bio Information Date (28)
Release Code (44)
Arrest Forward Code (42)
Forward Location (41)
Arrest Level (31)
Specific Target (23)
Sex (2)
A or B Priority (16)
IOC Involvement (22)
Kill/Capt./Rally/At Large (1)
Detention Facility (8)
Operation Level (19)
Neutralization Process. Date (20)
Neutralization Action Date (18)
Neutralization Location (17)
Row Cluster (4)
Action Force (7)
Job (13)
Black List (9)
ID Source (6)
Area of Operation (11)
Party Membership (3)
Echelon (5)
VCI Serial Number (10)
Record Update Count (14)
Age (15)
Arrest Year (33)
Sentence Process. Date (37)
Sentence Action Date (35)
Sentence Location (36)
Sentence Code (12)
Arrest Serial Number (32)
Release Processing Date (39)
Release Action Date (38)
Release Location (40)
2 1 0
Merge Height
Attribute Interaction Strength (Hierarchical Clustering) 
 Overall Attribute Importance (Rank)
Figure 2: Clustering of attributes by strength of interaction with merges selected to
minimize Ward’s distance (dendrogram). Rank order importance of each attribute in
terms of average maximal subtree depth in an unsupervised learning task (unsupervsied
random forest). Smaller rank means an attribute was selected sooner in the random
forest construction and is thus more informative overall.
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The first piece of summary information is a ranking of variables in terms of how
much information they convey about the entire dataset. The answer of the question
“Which fact should we start with?” is definitively the fate of the suspect: still at large,
killed, captured, or defector. No other single attribute implies as much about the re-
maining details as that one. The next most important is the suspect’s gender, followed
by whether they were a party member, the kind of record as estimated by the blockclus-
tering above, the suspect’s echelon, the source of information used to ID the suspect,
and so on.
The second is a pairwise distance between attributes in terms of how much in-
formation their interaction conveys about the entire dataset. Hierarchically clustering
attributes on that distance reveals what appears to be two mostly unconnected data
generating processes: one related to the creation of biographical records and dossiers,
and another related to the neutralization of suspects. The method has, without prompt-
ing, correctly recovered the undocumented difference between neutralization record
attributes and biographical record attributes. Justifying earlier concerns, the dossier
attribute “confirmed” is flagged as being closely related to other administrative details
of dossiers and not the core demographic attributes of suspects or the empirical process
of targeting.20
The clustering also pinpoints the place to start the analysis: a core group of 21
highly related and informative attributes relating to the neutralization and demograph-
ics of suspects. They are flanked by tangential groups of attributes relating to the sen-
tencing of a suspect, the release of a suspect, and the details of dossiers for biographical
records. There may be interesting structure within these other groups of attributes, but
they are mostly orthogonal to the core outcomes of interest and so can be safely set
aside for future work.
Having selected a core group of attributes, the next question is whether they can
be further summarized by a simpler topology. The next two sections unpack these
attributes and tackle dimensionality reduction with respect to two themes; the kinds
of victims, and the kinds of government operations. For that analysis, I weed the list
further to just 11 nominal demographic and neutralization attributes. I set aside dates
and locations. I exclude 5 attributes about the administrative aspects of the dataset.
And I single out two attributes, with a large number of categories, for detailed analysis:
the job of the suspect and the government actor responsible for the neutralization.
4 The Victims of Targeting
Who were the Phoenix Program’s victims? The program was charged with disman-
tling nonmilitary rebel organizations in South Vietnam.21 A full breakdown of suspect
counts by organization, demographic attributes, and final status is shown Table 3.
20This is all the more amazing because the variable is incorrectly imputed with values for the majority of
rows in the dataset. The method has correctly identified the subset of rows for which the variable takes on
meaningful values and has grouped it with related variables accordingly.
21With captured documents and defector reports, GVN and U.S. intelligence analysts mapped those orga-
nizations in great detail (Conley, 1967, 165).
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Outcome
At Large Killed Captured Defector
All % % % %
All 73,699 32 21 30 16
Organization PRP 54,977 31 19 34 15
NLF 7,147 33 13 28 26
Communist Orgs 11,315 39 33 13 15
Sex Male 56,257 36 25 22 16
Female 16,910 20 6 57 17
Party Full Member 22,443 48 29 13 10
Membership Unknown 29,470 37 19 31 12
Probationary Member 7,042 17 26 37 20
Non-Member 14,743 6 10 51 33
Echelon Hamlet 9,858 25 24 24 26
Village 44,513 31 20 33 15
District 12,917 42 23 22 13
City/Prov/Reg/COSVN 6,400 33 16 34 17
List Most Wanted List 24,285 65 21 9 4
Target List 15,687 40 18 30 12
Most Active List 8,136 23 15 51 11
Unknown 25,588 0 24 43 33
AorB A 43,645 42 25 18 15
B 29,790 18 15 47 19
Age [0,25] 15,500 19 14 47 21
(25,35] 14,858 37 22 25 16
(35,55] 27,225 35 14 31 20
(55,100] 3,742 22 5 56 17
Table 3: Cross tabulation of demographic properties against outcome.
Broadly, the political opposition to the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) was organized
into three groups. Political authority, command, and resources flowed from North Viet-
nam into South Vietnam through the communist political apparatus, the People’s Revo-
lutionary Party (PRP). Indigenous popular support and participation was organized into
the subordinate National Liberation Front (NLF), also called the Viet Cong. Together
they constructed alternative administrative institutions referred to as Communist Au-
thority Organizations, such as the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG), as well
as a number of political organizations designed to involve civilians outside of the com-
munist party.
Together, and with overlapping and changing roles and capabilities, these three
organizations embodied foreign authority, popular participation, and political institu-
tions. Four-fifths of neutralizations were against PRP positions with fewer directed
toward more indigenous NLF and Communist Organization positions. This is consis-
tent with both the priorities of the program and the timing in the war; the Post-Tet phase
was more externally driven by North Vietnam.
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Members or supporters performing active roles of these organizations were collec-
tively known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).22 VCI were grouped into Class
A VCI that were full or probationary PRP members or leadership and command roles
while class B VCI were trained but voluntary members. Where appropriate, roles were
replicated at multiple levels of governance called echelons including the hamlet, vil-
lage, district, province, city, capital, region, and national level.
The broad pattern is one of a program that targeted large numbers of low level
suspects, a portfolio of targets that was bottom heavy. Half of neutralizations were B
level voluntary/support positions, and a little more than half were previously unknown
to security forces. About a fifth of neutralizations were full party members, and about
a fifth of neutralizations were at the district or higher echelon. It is unclear, however,
whether this is disproportionate to the number of actual rebels holding those positions.
If the program selected targets uniformly from the rebel population, these rates are
probably proportional to the share of those positions of all rebel members during this
period of the war.
There is a strong relationship between the demographics of suspects and methods
of targeting. In brief, more important suspects were fewer in number but more directly
targeted, either by having a file while at large, or by being killed in an operation. Low
level suspects were less likely to have a file at large, and were much more likely to be
swept up as arrests or to walk in off the street as a defection.
The cross-tabulation in Table 3 shows this in terms of a single comparison between
demographics and the suspect’s final status. Targeting was gendered, with female sus-
pects much less likely to be killed or to be targeted as at large. Known party members
were more likely to be targeted at large, or killed, while suspects known to not be party
members were much more likely to simply be arrested or to defect. The lower the
suspect’s echelon, the more likely they were simply arrested or defected and the fewer
targeted while at large.
The same is true for the level of prior suspicion against the suspect. More prior sus-
picion is associated with more severe outcomes. Previously unknown suspects tended
to be arrested in the field or defectors, not killed.23 Moving up the ladder of suspicion
to the most active list, the target list, and the most wanted list increases the chances that
the suspect is killed by an operation or targeted at large.24 The same pattern holds true
for the A or B priority of the suspect’s position.
Visualizing the underlying pattern in just the bivariate case is already somewhat
overwhelming. Extending the analysis to the multivariate case and developing a sim-
plifying taxonomy is the task of dimensionality reduction that I turn to next.
22Military personnel serving in organizational roles, e.g. on Military Affairs Committee, could qualify as
VCI.
23By definition, a previously unknown suspect (not on a black list) did not have a biographical record (was
not targeted at large).
24Note that the data speak to the probability of being under suspicion given already being targeted. Esti-
mating changes in the risk of being targeted as a function of suspicion would require additional information
about the population of rebels overall.
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4.1 A Taxonomy of Suspects
Is there a simpler topology for understanding differences between victims? I frame
this as a dimensionality reduction problem where nominal values for each of the cate-
gorical variables are mapped to common latent dimensions. The method I use for this
estimation is Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). MCA is a multivariate tech-
nique analogous to Principal Components Analysis but for unordered categorical data
(Lê et al., 2008).
Let an I×Q matrix represent the values for each individual i and attribute q with
Kq possible values for each attribute and K total possible values. This matrix is then
converted to an I ×K disjunctive table (dummy variables for each level of each vari-
able). Rarely used categories disproportionately influence the construction of these
dimensions, so I suppress both rare and missing values.25
I use a variant of the algorithm called Specific Multiple Correspondence Analy-
sis that correctly calculates partial distance between points given levels were dropped
(Roux & Rouanet, 2009).26 It decomposes the disjunctive table into principle axis rep-
resenting latent dimensions, points for individuals in that reduced space, and points for
each attribute value in the same space. The result is a geometric interpretation of the
originally categorical data where suspects and attributes are all now projected into a
smaller number of continuous dimensions.
The core variation of the dataset is well summarized by a few latent dimensions,
with the first two principal axis accounting for 74% of total variation (inertia).27 They
are summarized in Table 4. The first dimension (56%) reflects a clear demographic
concept of the suspect’s importance to the targeting program. At one extreme are unim-
portant, previously unknown, low level volunteers, often caught in large raids. At the
extreme are high level, full party members, that are on the most wanted list, but usually
remain at large.
The second dimension (18%) reflects the method of neutralization used. At one ex-
treme are killings, sometimes targeting specific individuals, in operations directed by
the local intelligence office. At the other extreme are defections, that required no pre-
vious effort by an intelligence office, where the identity was confirmed by the suspects
own confession. In between lie arrests which share aspects of both kinds of targeting.
25This is another motivation for carefully studying missingness in the database. The main source of vari-
ation in the database is technical, the difference between different kinds of records. I manually suppress
missing values and purely administrative variables so that the estimated components reflect only the substan-
tive empirical variation between attributes.
26Implemented in the R package soc.ca.
27In total 18 dimensions account for 100% of variation.
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Dimension 1 (56%) Ctr. Coord. Dimension 2 (18%) Ctr. Coord.
(+)
At Large 13.7 1.18 Killed 14.4 1.21
Most Wanted List 10.5 1.03 Order of Battle for ID 13.3 1.45
Full Party Member 5.6 0.78 Specific Target 8.8 1.05
A Priority 4.0 0.47 Result of IOCC Information 7.7 0.71
Subsector/District Level Op. 6.9 0.57
Directed by IOCC 5.4 0.98
Non-specific Target 8.3 -0.79 Defector 10.9 -1.19
(-)
Captured 8.2 -0.95 Confession for ID 7.1 -0.98
Unknown (No List) 6.2 -0.77 No IOCC Involvement 3.0 -0.7
B Priority 5.8 -0.69
Subsector/District Level Op. 5.4 -0.63
Result of IOCC Information 4.3 -0.66
Non-Party Member 4.0 -0.81
Agent/Informer for ID 4.0 -0.78
Female 3.6 -0.73
Age [0,25] 3.0 -0.69
Table 4: The first two dimensions of demographic and operations attributes estimated
with multiple correspondence analysis for all suspects. Contribution and coordinates of
specific values shown for attributes with above average contribution to each dimension.
This provides a clean language for describing civilian targeting in terms of just two
concepts. First, there are suspects the government wishes it could target and those that
it actually targets in practice. Second, of those it targets, there is a spectrum ranging
from suspects that tend to defect, suspects that tend to be arrested or captured out in
the field, and suspects that tend to be assassinated (or who die in battle but the program
claims credit). A map of each value in the two dimensions is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Attribute values for all suspects projected into two dimensions with multiple
correspondence analysis.
For studies that use counts of rebel or civilian deaths as a dependent variable, this
shows that those raw counts could be driven by changes in at least three different under-
lying dynamics: (1) the intensity of the war, growing or shrinking the size of the target
list or the number of operations looking for suspects not on a list; (2) changes in effec-
tiveness, neutralizing more or fewer known targets already on the list; or (3) changes
in tactics, using more killings than arrests or more defections preempting killings, etc.
Shifts along any of these dimensions could produce changes in total body counts or the
portfolio of observed violence (e.g. ratios of civilian to military deaths). There is cur-
rently little in the way of theoretical expectations for how interventions should interact
with each of these dimensions, much less how those interactions should aggregate into
changes in total observed levels of violence.
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4.2 The Jobs Held by Suspects
As an external check of validity, I compare the estimated position of each suspect along
the dimensions of targeting to a description of the job they held. If the dimensions are
correct, and useful, then jobs with similar functions ought to be more similar to each
other in terms of targeting. I find that suspects with similar jobs, as described by
third party sources, do in fact have similar demographic attributes and similar targeting
behavior by the government. If the underlying data were faked or entered with error,
they were at least doing it in a consistent and creative way.
Each suspect is tagged with one of 485 specific jobs, coded according to a stan-
dardized official schema called the Greenbook. Each jobs is nested within increasingly
large departments called elements, subsections, sections, and the three main branches.
I focus on the section level of aggregation. The location of each section along the
dimensions of targeting is estimated by including the section attribute as a noncon-
tributing covariate in the Multiple Correspondence Analysis introduced earlier. A map
of sections along the two dimensions of targeting is shown Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Map of rebel sections projected into the two dimensions of suspect impor-
tance and severity of outcome.
Most of the variation across sections is on the first dimension of priority (horizontal
axis). At one extreme on the far left are low level logistics related sections like the
Commo-Liaison and Rear Service sections, where suspects were rarely targeted at large
and mostly swept up as arrests. At the other extreme, on the right, are high level
leadership positions like the NLF Central Committee and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government where almost every suspect was most wanted but still at large. Along the
second dimension of severity of outcome (vertical axis), some sections were likely
to be specifically targeted or killed, e.g. Guerilla Units, Military Affairs Section, or
Area Administrative Officials. At the other extreme some groups were much more
likely to defect, e.g. the Medical Section, the Frontline Supply Council, or the Western
Highlands Autonomous People’s Movement.
Next I cluster the sections according to their distance along the targeting dimen-
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sions.28 The 30 sections with 100 or more suspects are described in Table 5. They
are arranged hierarchically using Ward’s method by their proximity in biographical di-
mensions estimated with MCA above (Ward, 1963). Each section is provided with a
brief description based on their functions as outlined by U.S. intelligence (Combined
Intelligence Center, Vietnam, 1969).
Section N Description Org.
Liberation Farmers’ Ass’n 2,230 Mass Org. Local NLF
Cadre Affairs 2,007 Intel, Proselytizing PRP
Guerilla Unit 4,593 Armed local forces Org
Military Affairs 1,671 Coordinate Guerrillas PRP
People’s Council 447 Administration Org
Area Adm. Officials 1,406 Administration Org
Peoples Rev. Comm. 2,202 Administration PRP
Organization Section 188 Administration PRP
Specialized 126 NLF
Nflsv Secretariat 216 NLF Leadership NLF
Nflsv Central Committee 594 NLF Leadership NLF
Political Officers 337 PRP Leadership PRP
Liberation Workers’ Ass’n 137 Mass Org, Urban NLF
Land Distribution 663 PRP
Security 6,990 Intel., Police, Justice PRP
Party Office 163 Administration PRP
Culture-Indoctrination 2,210 Propaganda PRP
Finance-Economy 7,845 Logistics, Taxes, Food PRP
Liberation Youth Ass’n 1,050 Mass Org, Youth NLF
Action Arrow Team 2,665 Mobile Security Org
Political Struggle 443
Liberation Women’s Ass’n 2,654 Mass Org. Women. NLF
Military Proselyting 5,848 Turn GVN soldiers PRP
Medical 3,387 Public/Civil health PRP
Civilian Proselyting 1,538 Party Recruiting PRP
Frontline Supply Council 681 Logistics. PRP
Production 1,375 Rear Production PRP
Special Action 1,425 Sappers PRP
Commo-Liaison 9,425 Logistics, Routes PRP
Rear Service 3,037 Logistics, Military PRP
Table 5: Organizational sections with over 100 suspects. Hierarchical clustering with
Ward’s distance shown in dendrogram on the left.
The clustering has recovered groups of sections with similar functions, arranged
into roughly four themes. The fighting themed cluster contains four large sections in-
cluding the Guerrilla Unit, Military Affairs, Cadre Affairs, and the Liberation Farmers
28I calculate euclidean distance on the first three dimensions which account for over 80% of the variation.
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Association. All operated at the low village or hamlet level and were high risk in terms
of chance of being killed.
A leadership themed cluster includes seven small groups with positions that op-
erated at the village, district, or higher echelon, and were more likely to be targeted
while at large or killed if neutralized. This includes the NLF Secretariat, the NLF
Central Committee, Area Administration Officials, etc.
There are two village administration themed clusters. The first leans toward higher
priority and more violent outcomes. It includes, Political Officers, the Security Section,
the Party Office, the Culture and Indoctrination, and the Finance-Economy Section.
This captures the main justice, propaganda, and tax collection infrastructure at the
district and village level. The second administration themed cluster includes village
level Womens’ and Youth associations, the Military and Civilian Proselyting Sections,
and sections responsible for medical and food production. This captures very local
leadership and organization at the village level.
A final logistics themed cluster includes three sections, Special Action, Commo-
Liaison, and Rear Service. Suspects in these sections were much more likely to be
captured, of very low priority in terms of not being party members, not on a wanted
list, B level positions, and women.
This set of clusters provides a way to think about targeting the different compo-
nents of an insurgency: a fighting component, a leadership component, a day to day
administration component, and a logistical tail. Both the demographics of suspects
and the targeting methods of the government vary systematically across these different
components. This is important for studies that use violence over time as a dependent
variable. If any of these groups change in size or in level of activity, it will change the
aggregate body count in potentially unpredictable ways.
5 The Methods of Targeting
Killings and arrests required the government to launch an operation, and defections
required a receiving government actor or office. Which government actors conducted
those operations and what methods did they use? When a suspect is neutralized, the
details of the circumstance or operation leading to their neutralization were recorded.
The details of each neutralization are cross-tabulated against outcomes in Table 6.
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Outcome
Killed Captured Defector
All % % %
All 49,774 31 45 24
Source Agent/Informer 16,296 37 56 7
Captured Document 4,428 44 45 11
Confession 11,633 7 42 52
Order of Battle 9,942 50 41 9
Other Source 7,249 22 31 47
Level DTA/Other/Region 3,835 30 43 27
Sector/Province 6,880 27 58 15
Subsector/District 33,296 37 50 13
IOCC No Involvement 9,637 29 46 25
Result of Info 24,127 38 52 9
Directed by 8,785 38 59 3
Specific Non-specific 32,467 31 49 20
Specific 12,630 43 49 8
Table 6: Properties of operations across neutralization outcomes.
The tabulations show a program with a large base of incidental arrests and killings
in the course of regular operations topped with a sizable number of direct planned
strikes against specific targets. A full third of killings and captures were suspects target
by an operation, often an ambush along a route or a raid. About a third were from
operations directed by an IOCC. As noted before, more than half of killed or captured
suspects were already previously listed on a blacklist.
The identity of a suspect had to be confirmed at the time of neutralization. For
previously unidentified suspects, the source of ID at the time of neutralization may have
been the source that led them to be a suspect in the first place. For suspects already on
a blacklist or listed in the Political Order of Battle, there was some unobserved process
by which evidence was collected, leading to the initial suspicion. The majority were
either identified by another civilian (an agent or informer) or they were said to have
confessed. Others were confirmed by material evidence like documents captured on
their person or identifying them by name. Some were confirmed against descriptions
in the Political Order of Battle (OB). About 12% were identified as “other” explained
in a written comment on the back of the worksheet and not recorded here.
5.1 A Taxonomy of Targeting Operations
Neutralizations can also be well summarized by a simpler typology. I fit the same
specific multiple correspondence model as before to just the subset of observations
resulting in arrest or killing. The first principal axis accounts for 59% of the variation
and, as before, reflects the level of priority of the suspect. At one extreme are low level
incidental captures and at the other killings against priority targets. To a lesser degree it
also captures the level of premeditation, as high priority targets were more likely to be
the specific target of an operation and the target of an operation planned and directed
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by an IOCC.
Dimension 1 (59%) Ctr. Coord. Dimension 2 (15%) Ctr. Coord.
(+)
Most Wanted List 13.3 1.37 No IOCC Involvement 19.0 1.34
Full Party Member 10.9 1.11 Other Source for ID 14.1 1.59
A Priority 7.8 0.66 Sector/Province Level Op. 8.0 0.96
Killed 7.8 0.73 Other Level Op. 7.7 1.57
Order of Battle for ID 6.9 0.9 Province Echelon 3.7 1.19
Specific Target 5.5 0.71 Unknown (No List) 3.2 0.36
B Priority 7.9 -0.67 Result of IOCC Information 9.6 -0.55
(-)
Female 5.8 -0.76 Captured Document for ID 5.3 -0.95
Captured 5.4 -0.51 Subsector/District Level Op. 4.7 -0.33
Age [0,25] 3.3 -0.61 Most Active List 3.0 -0.62
Confession for ID 3.0 -0.76 Target List 2.9 -0.51
Table 7: The first two dimensions representing demographic and operations related
attributes estimated with multiple correspondence analysis for only observations re-
sulting in killing or capture. Contribution and coordinates of specific values shown for
attributes with above average contribution to each dimension.
The second principal axis accounts for 15% of the variation and reflects the domain
of the operation. On one end are operations that found VCI and reported them retroac-
tively to the intelligence infrastructure for documentation. These operations typically
had no IOCC involvement, were carried out by more conventional forces, and at the
province or sector level. At the other extreme are operations carried out by Phoenix
related forces against targets known about beforehand. These operations were at the
subsector or district level, against village echelon level targets, who were on the most
active or target black lists, and benefited from information provided by the IOCC. The
map of each attribute value along these two dimensions is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Attribute values for just killing and captures projected into two dimensions
with multiple correspondence analysis.
5.2 The Perpetrators of Targeting
There were 16 different organizations reported as the government actor in the neutral-
ization of suspects. As an additional external check of validity, Figure 6 shows the
position of the actors along the two dimensions of priority and domain. If the under-
lying data are accurate and well summarized by these dimensions, then actors with
similar functions ought to be similar to each other in terms of victims and tactics.
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Figure 6: Government actors responsible for killings and captures projected into the
two dimensions of importance and domain.
A clustering of actors along the dimensions of operations are shown in Table 8.
On paper, the official Phoenix Forces were the National Police, the Provincial Recon-
naissance Units, Rural Development Cadre, Civilian Irregular Defense Group, and the
Armed Propaganda Team (APT). In practice, the tent poles of the Phoenix Program
were the Popular Forces, Regional Forces and Special Police who made up two-thirds
of all killings and captures.
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Actor N Description
Special Police (SP) 5,375 Urban Police
National Police (NP) 3,604 Urban/Suburban Police
Military Security Service (MSS) 561 Counter-intelligence
Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) 3,190 Mobile Special Forces
National Police Field Force (NPFF) 1,065 Mobile Rural Policing
Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) 1,919 Regular GVN Military
Armed Propaganda Team (APT) 310 Mobile Cultural Team
Regional Forces (RF) 14,356 District/Province Paramilitary
Popular Forces (PF) 5,195 Hamlet/Village Paramilitary
Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) 146 Irregular Militia
Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) 111 Irregular Militia
Free World Military Assistance Force 308 Allied, South Korea
U.S. Forces 899 Regular U.S. Military
Other 539
Table 8: Government actors responsible for neutralizations. Grouped according to
similarity on operation properties estimated with multiple correspondence analysis.
Dendrogram shows hierarchical clustering using Ward’s method.
It reveals four small clusters. The first cluster includes urban and suburban police
organizations that were much more likely to arrest than kill. This is likely because
they were both in areas of greater government control where contestation was less
violent overall and because they were more likely to document their arrests than less
institutionalized forces.
The second cluster includes mobile forces who operated in areas of weaker gov-
ernment control but still had close ties to the Phoenix Program in terms of intelligence
sharing and reporting. Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), for example, were
specially designed units for the Phoenix Program who had the highest rate of neutral-
izations per fighter (Thayer, 1985, 210).
The third cluster contains paramilitary forces, Regional Forces were responsible for
routes and intersections while Popular Forces were responsible for village and hamlet
defense. Their neutralizations were the most violent and numerous. This is because
of where they operated (in more contested areas), their high numbers (having more
manpower in more places than police forces), and their tactics (equipped and trained
for defense and attack rather than regular policing).
A final cluster represents conventional forces: the U.S. and Free World Military
Assistance forces (primarily South Korean). These forces reported few suspects to the
national database, likely because of parallel reporting mechanisms and also because
they were engaged in larger more conventional fighting.
These clusters provide a way to think about targeting as a function of different kinds
of government forces: regular police, expeditionary forces, paramilitary forces, and
conventional forces. Each employs different tactics, in a different environment, with
a different portfolio of victims, and different incentives and capabilities to report back
statistics. This is particularly relevant to the study of aggregate levels of violence. Over
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the course of a conflict, the size and level of activity of these four groups will change.
Forces are raised, units move around the country, and police and paramilitary forces
are extended to newly secured communities. Each of these will impact the amount of
violence committed and the number of casualties reported in a given area over a given
period of time.
6 Conclusion
The Phoenix Program provides an unusually clear view of a large wartime government
targeting effort. In the aggregate, it provides an example of a typically mixed target-
ing program. Most processed neutralizations were of low priority targets, while occa-
sionally the program had the intelligence, or good luck, to launch operations against
high-profile targets. This pattern is a result of the fundamental feature of civil war, an
inability to easily separate rebels from neutral civilians.
That said, based on the portion of targeting recorded in the national database, the
government did track and target a large number of suspects with verifiable links. In the
same way that policing is primarily about deterring illegal behavior through small risks
of punishment, the Phoenix Program offered a credible risk to rebels who might have
otherwise operated openly or civilians who were on the fence about joining.
There is a strong connection between a suspect’s demographics, their position in
rebel organizations, the kind of government actor that would target them, the methods
that would be used, and their ultimate fate. A combination of dimensionality reduction
and clustering suggests a few simplifying ways to describe that connection. Suspects
vary in priority to the government in terms of who it wishes it could target and who it
targets in practice. The outcomes for suspects vary in severity ranging from voluntary
defection to death in the field. Operations vary in the priority of the suspect, arresting
large numbers of unimportant suspects in sweeps and launching premeditated oper-
ations to kill more important suspects. Operations also vary across domains. Some
operations are carried out far away from intelligence and police infrastructure and are
underreported in official statistics. Other operations are carried out in clear view, of-
ten using previous intelligence and regularly reporting back for inclusion in official
statistics.
The data also reveal clear organizational differences between different govern-
ment actors and different rebel sections. Rebel sections have functions that fall into
groups related to fighting, high level leadership, low level administration, and logisti-
cal support. Government actors fall into groups of regular police, expeditionary forces,
paramilitary forces, and conventional forces. Each kind of organizational subdivision
has a distinct signature in terms of types of civilians involved and the types of targeting
methods employed.
One motivation for moving toward bigger (wider) data in conflict studies is that
they reveal these underlying dimensions, organizational types, and processes which
typically get relegated to an error term. These results should be a cautionary tale for
analysis based on raw event counts, often drawn from newspapers or similarly shallow
reporting. Targeting in the Vietnam War was very high dimensional. An analyst could
reach dramatically different conclusions about outcomes by truncating the sample to
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just killings, by omitting information about the suspect’s position or the government
actor committing the violence, or by missing important details about how the institution
created records and aggregated them into a final dataset.
With data this detailed, the analysis provided here is just the tip of the iceberg. I
have shown ways to identify and explore the main sources of variation in a database, but
there are many other places in the data to look for interesting structure. There are three
that come immediately to mind. The first is exploring the spatial and temporal structure
of data. The Vietnam War varied from province to province and often from village
to village, which should have clear implications for how civilians were treated. The
second is how neutralizations were related to one another. I have treated neutralizations
as isolated events, but in reality they were often part of larger operations. There is
enough detail on locations and timing to aggregate individual observations into a larger
event level analysis. Finally, the structure of rebel organizations is an entire field of
study on its own, and the detailed data on rebel jobs, locations, and demographics can
provide a remarkable map of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese organization across
South Vietnam.
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